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1. Introduction
Separatist and/or decentralizing pressures are very often associated to both
interregional inequality and cultural heterogeneity between regions. Typically,
there are two culturally homogeneous regions, and one of them is richer (such
as Flanders in Belgium or Catalonia in Spain). As a result of one region being
richer, a centrally implemented redistribution policy involves implicit interre-
gional transfers taking place, and thus transfers of resources between individuals
who do not share a common identity. The potential wish of the richer region
to decentralize redistribution suggests two things: rst, being richer, the region
might want to implement its own redistribution policy which would be closer
to the preferences of its population. Second, it might also be the case that the
interregional transfers taking place through the centralized redistribution pol-
icy are not considered as legitimate by its population, and thus a decentralized
system could be a way to get rid of it.
Fundamentally, the presence of this two-sided heterogeneity between regions,
that is, in average income and group identity, gives rise to some trade-o¤ regard-
ing the choice between centralized versus decentralized redistribution. Indeed,
if a centralized system allows for a potentially benecial pooling of national re-
sources, and thus permits to reduce interregional inequality, it also has a cost
in the sense that individuals might be less willing to redistribute in a culturally
divided society. That is, there might be a decrease in the degree of solidarity
in the society under centralization. In order to capture this trade-o¤, we set
up a political economy model where individuals vote over a one-dimensional
redistributive parameter, assuming that voters are utilitarian altruists and care
relatively more about the well-being of individuals of their own region (i.e. there
is group loyalty). We assume that there are two (culturally homogeneous) re-
gions, and that one of them is richer in the sense that it has a higher proportion
of rich individuals. As a result, under a centralized system, there is a net trans-
fer of resources from the rich to the poor region, this transfer being potentially
undesirable from an individual point of view as a result of the lack of a common
identity between the two regions.
The aim of the paper is both positive and normative. First, we characterize
the equilibrium level of redistribution under both centralization and decentral-
ization, and investigate its behavior as several parameters of the model vary. In
particular, we show that while group loyalty always has a positive e¤ect on re-
distribution under decentralization, it might either increase or decrease support
for redistribution in a centralized system depending on whether the decisive
voter is from the poor or the rich region. Second, using the solution of the social
planner problem as a benchmark, we investigate which institutional system -
centralized or decentralized - is best from a welfare perspective. It turns out
that in this set up, due to the assumptions regarding individual preferences for
redistribution, the maximization of total welfare is closely related to the mini-
mization of inequality, both within and between regions. Finally, we investigate
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under which conditions the solution yielding higher total welfare is sustainable
as an equilibrium in a direct democracy, and if not, whether there exists an
accommodating policy such that the ine¢ cient solution can be avoided.
There is a large body of experimental evidence showing that individuals
tend to behave in an altruistic manner (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002)). In this paper, we model preferences for
redistribution based on utilitarian altruism, and, following Luttmer (2001), we
assume that the strength of altruism towards specic individuals is determined
by group loyalty. That is, individuals care mostly about the welfare of those
belonging to their own group. As we assume a common identity within a region,
this means that individuals care relatively more about redistribution patterns
in their own region.
There is a growing literature studying the e¤ects of fractionalization along
religious, ethnic or linguistic lines on public policy. In particular, the idea
that support for redistribution might be lower in culturally diverse societies has
been documented both empirically (see, among others, Alesina et al. (1999)
and Luttmer (2001)) and theoretically (see, for instance, Austen-Smith and
Wallerstein (2006) and Lind (2004)). Alesina et al. (1999) show that ethnic
diversity tends to reduce both the supply of public goods and redistribution,
and explain this fact based on heterogeneity of tastes. More generally, several
theoretical reasons have been advanced in order to explain the detrimental ef-
fect of cultural diversity on public policy. Cultural diversity here is relevant
to create high intra-group loyalty and less between-group loyalty. That is, we
assume that individuals care relatively more, if not only, about the well-being
of members of their own group. In that sense, we are not concerned with the
fact that preferences regarding public policy might di¤er between groups. A
very related work is the one of Lind (2004). The author highlights the fact that
heterogeneity between individuals regarding both identity and income might
have a joint impact on support for redistribution. In particular, he shows that
while inequality within groups has the usual e¤ect of promoting redistribution,
inequality between groups has the opposite e¤ect of reducing support for re-
distribution. However, as he does not assume that groups are geographically
segmented, his focus is not on centralized versus decentralized redistribution.
The fact of regions being di¤erently rich and the e¤ect that this can have on
decentralizing redistribution has already been investigated in a political econ-
omy context. For example, Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that if regions
di¤er in their average income, majority rule at the federal level will produce less
redistribution than at the local level. In their seminal paper on the breakup of
nations, Bolton and Roland (1997) focus on the e¤ects of regional heterogeneity
regarding both average and median income on the incentives of a region to se-
cede, assuming that a breakup involves an e¢ ciency cost. While in those papers,
the authors assume heterogeneity regarding regional income distribution, they
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do not assume any kind of cultural heterogeneity between regions nor altruistic
motives for redistribution.
Now, the possibility of individuals to exhibit altruistic preferences, this altru-
ism being determined by group loyalty, and the e¤ect this has on decentralizing
redistribution, has also been investigated from a theoretical perspective. In his
seminal paper, Pauly (1973) shows that if redistribution is a spatially limited
public good, it can be e¢ ciently implemented at the local level. However, he
does not address the issue of redistribution between regions, which clearly calls
for some centralization. In Paulys model, a decentralized policy has the advan-
tage of being closer to regional tastes regarding redistribution. In that sense, his
result can be seen as an application of Oates decentralization theorem. In con-
trast, in our model, decentralization has the advantage of potentially increasing
the degree of solidarity in the society, and hence redistribution. Another related
work is the one of Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2006), where it is assumed that vot-
ers care about the poor only in their own community (i.e. there is full group
loyalty), while a decentralized system implies tax competition between jurisdic-
tions and hence a possible race to the bottom. They show that the best level of
government regarding redistribution is determined by a trade-o¤which depends
on the nature of altruism (i.e. pure vs impure altruism). While Bjorvatn and
Cappelen (2006) allow for tax competition under decentralization, they assume
that jurisdictions are equally rich and hence abstract from all questions related
to interregional inequality.
Therefore, while the separate e¤ects of the two sources of regional hetero-
geneity - income and group identity - on the choice between a centralized versus
decentralized system of redistribution have already been studied theoretically,
their joint impact has not yet been investigated. As we have already argued
earlier in this introduction, we believe that the interactions between regional
di¤erences regarding both income and identity have important implications con-
cerning the issue of decentralizing redistribution both from a positive and a
normative point of view.
Several conclusions arise from our analysis. First, there is no rationale for
decentralization as long as only one source of heterogeneity is present. If the
regions share a common identity (i.e. there is no group loyalty), everybody is
better o¤under a centralized system, no matter if the regions are identical or not
regarding their average income. Similarly, whenever the two regions are equally
rich, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization, even when individuals
care more about their own region. Furthermore, the analysis of the symmetric
case reveals that a centralized system has an additional benet in terms of the
positive e¤ect it creates on the willingness of the median voter to pay taxes,
just because redistribution is implemented at a larger scale. Second, increased
heterogeneity between regions need not increase the relative attractiveness of
decentralization from a welfare perspective. Third, with full group loyalty, that
is, in the absence of spillovers, it is not generally true that a decentralized system
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is more e¢ cient. Fourth, allowing for a transfer under decentralization need not
increase total welfare. Furthermore, due to free riding, centralization welfare-
dominates decentralization for all values of group loyalty for which the transfer
is positive.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model,
and characterizes the equilibrium level of redistribution under both decentral-
ization and centralization. Section 3 describes the link between both intra- and
interregional inequality and total welfare using the the social planner problem
of this economy. Section 4 compares the welfare properties of the decentral-
ized and centralized solutions in a direct democracy for both the symmetric
and non-symmetric case. Section 5 analyzes the political economy of the choice
between decentralization and centralization, and investigates whether the best
solution from a welfare perspective is sustainable as an equilibrium in a direct
democracy. Section 6 introduces the possibility of voluntary after-tax transfers
between regions under decentralization, and compares the welfare levels of the
three institutional arrangements. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
There are two regions A and B of equal size. There are rich and poor
individuals (voters) in both regions. All the poor individuals in the economy
are endowed with income yP and all the rich with income yR, where yR > yP .
There are n voters in total: nA voters in region A and nB voters in region
B, where nA = nB . Furthermore, there are nRA rich and n
P
A poor voters in
region A and nRB rich and n
P
B poor voters in region B. Therefore, we have that
n = nA + nB =
 
nRA + n
P
A

+
 
nRB + n
P
B

. Only the rich voters pay taxes, and
only the poor voters receive a transfer from taxation. The tax rate is linear and
there is no deadweight loss from taxation.
The budget constraints of the rich and poor voters in region j = A;B under
decentralization are thus given by
cRj = (1  tj) yR
cPj = y
P +
nRj tjy
R
nPj
Under centralization, those constraints become
cR = (1  t) yR
cP = yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B
 
nPA + n
P
B
yRt
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In order to focus on donor motivation, we assume that the median voter is
a rich individual1 . Voters are utilitarian altruists, and the utility function of a
rich individual from region A is given by
URA = u
 
cRA

+



nPA
nA
u
 
cPA

+
nRA
nA
u
 
cRA

+ (1  )

nPB
nB
u
 
cPB

+
nRB
nB
u
 
cRB

where u (:) is strictly increasing and concave, and where  2  12 ; 1 is the
group loyalty parameter. Therefore, when  = 12 , the individual cares equally
about both regions, and when  = 1, he only cares about his own region. One
veries easily that preferences are single-peaked on the tax rate dimension under
both centralization and decentralization, and thus the median voter theorem
applies.
In this set up, average income heterogeneity between regions arises from the
fact that nRA 6= nRB , so that there are interregional transfers taking place under
a centralized system of redistribution. Furthermore, lack of common identity
between the two regions is captured by the group loyalty parameter .
2.1. Equilibrium Redistribution under Decentralization
In order to choose the regional equilibrium tax rate, the median voter in
region j = A;B maximizes URj with respect to tj . Deriving the expression with
respect to the tax rate tj and setting this quantity equal to zero yields
@URj
@tj
= 0
, u0  cRj  = nRjnj u0  cPj   u0  cRj 
Assume for tractability that private utility is logarithmic, that is, u (c) = ln c.
In this case, the equilibrium under decentralization is described in Proposition
1 below.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium tax rate in region j = A;B under the
decentralized solution is given by
tj =

(1 + )
nPj
nj
 
yR   yP 
yR
  1
(1 + )
nPj
nRj
yP
yR
Furthermore, it has the following properties:
(i) @tj
@nPj
> 0 if and only if  > y
P
(yR yP )

nj
nRj
2
;
1Furthermore, if the poor was decisive, the equilibrium level of redistribution would be
such that the poor ends up consuming more than the rich, which is unrealistic.
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(ii) @tj
@yR
> 0 and @tj
@yP
< 0;
(iii) @tj@ > 0 and
@tj
@ > 0.
Proof : in appendix.
From (i), the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the number of poor individ-
uals if and only if altruism and group loyalty are high enough2 . In particular,
the higher pre-tax income dispersion and the proportion of rich, or, in other
words, the cheaper to redistribute both in terms of proportions and in terms of
marginal utility, the more likely that the condition will be satised. From (ii),
the regional tax rate is increasing in pre-tax income dispersion, that is, as in the
standard model of voting on redistribution (Meltzer and Richards (1981)), more
pre-tax income inequality leads to more redistribution in equilibrium. Finally,
when  increases, the median voter becomes relatively more altruistic, which
increases his preferred tax rate. Notice that when the group loyalty parameter
 increases, it has exactly the same e¤ect as an increase in . Indeed, as here
there is no possibility of interregional transfers, the group loyalty parameter
does not di¤er in essence from the altruistic weight . Stronger group loyalty
is equivalent to stronger altruism in this case, meaning a higher willingness to
redistribute in equilibrium.
2.2. Equilibrium Redistribution under Centralization
Assume, without loss of generality, that the decisive voter under centraliza-
tion is from region A. As we assume that the median voter is rich, if nA = nB
and nRA > n
R
B , it follows directly that the rich region is decisive under central-
ization. However, in order to be more general, we would like to allow for the
possibility of the poor region being decisive under the centralized solution. This
could be the case, for instance, if we allow region sizes to di¤er. However, as we
do not want a particular region to have more weight in the aggregate, we will
keep the assumption of equal region size, and just assume that either the poor
or the rich region can be decisive under centralization3 .
As in the case of decentralization, the median voter (from region A) will
implement his preferred tax rate so as to maximize URA . Deriving this expression
with respect to the tax rate t and setting this quantity equal to zero yields
@URA
@t
= 0
,
 
nRA + n
R
B
 
nPA + n
P
B
"  nPAnA u0  cPA
+(1  ) nPBnB u0
 
cPB
 # = u0  cRA+
"

nRA
nA
u0
 
cRA

+(1  ) nRBnB u0
 
cRB
 #
2Notice that when taking the derivative with respect to the number of poor individuals,
we keep region size constant. That is, we look at the e¤ect of an increase in the regional
proportion of poor individuals.
3Note that the two regions having di¤erent sizes does not have any e¤ect on voting deci-
sions, as it is the regional proportions of rich and poor that enter individual preferences.
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Assuming that private utility is logarithmic, the equilibrium tax rate is de-
scribed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium tax rate under the centralized solution is
given by
t =
1
(1 + )
(



nPA
nA
+ (1  ) n
P
B
nB

  y
P
yR
 
nPA + n
P
B
 
nRA + n
R
B
 1 + nRA
nA
+  (1  ) n
R
B
nB
)
Furthermore, it has the following properties:
(i) @t
@nPA
> 0 if and only if  > e
(ii) @t
@nPB
> 0 if and only if  < b < 1
(iii) @t
@yR
> 0 and @t
@yP
< 0
(iv) @t@ > 0
(v) @t@ > 0 if and only if
(nPA nPB)
(nPA+nPB)
> y
P
yR
(nRA nRB)
(nRA+nRB)
Proof : in appendix.
From (i), the centralized tax rate is increasing in the proportion of local
poor if  is strictly higher than some threshold. From (ii), it is increasing in the
proportion of poor in B if  is strictly lower than some (other) threshold. In fact,
as @
2t
(@nPA)
2 < 0 and @
2t
(@nPB)
2 < 0, the tax rate is concave in both proportions of
poor. Notice that when  = 1, @t
@nPB
is strictly negative for any other parameter
values. That is, with full group loyalty, and given that region A is decisive, the
centralized tax rate is decreasing in the proportion of poor in B. Furthermore,
this is true no matter if region A is the rich or the poor region. Finally, as in the
decentralized case, the tax rate is increasing in both pre-tax income dispersion
and general altruism.
From (v), if region A is the rich (and decisive) region in the sense that
the proportion of rich people is higher than in B, an increase in group loyalty
will decrease the equilibrium tax rate. As the median voter cares relatively
more about his own poor, the fact that most (i.e. more than 50%) of the tax
revenue goes to the other region induces him to implement a lower tax rate
in equilibrium. Conversely, if region A is the poor region (i.e. nPA > n
P
B), an
increase in  increases the equilibrium tax rate, as the decisive voter wants to
exploit the rich voters in the rich region to a greater extent4 .
In order to see what would be a rst best solution in this economy, we now
turn to the social planner problem under both centralization and decentraliza-
tion.
4Whether the centralized tax rate is increasing or not in  only depends on whether nPA >
nPB , and not on regional incomes, even when allowing for yA 6= yB . However, this feature is
due to the logarithmic form of private utilities. See the appendix for the e¤ect of  on the
centralized tax rate for the general case.
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3. Inequality and Welfare: the Social Planner Problem
Our criterion to compare centralization and decentralization will be total
welfare. Assuming that the poor has the same utility function as the rich5 ,
total welfare under decentralization is given by
W (tA; tB) = n
R
AU
R
A (tA; tB) + n
P
AU
P
A (tA; tB) + n
R
BU
R
B (tA; tB) + n
P
BU
P
B (tA; tB)
Simplifying this expression, total welfare becomes
W (tA; tB) = (1 + )

nRAu
 
cRA

+ nPAu
 
cPA

+ nRBu
 
cRB

+ nPBu
 
cPB

Similarly, total welfare under centralization is given by
W (t) = (1 + )

u
 
cR
  
nRA + n
R
B

+ u
 
cP
  
nPA + n
P
B

We dene inequality as the total dispersion of nal consumptions (i.e. con-
sumption variance). The average consumption in the economy is given by
c =
nRAy
R
A+n
R
By
R
B+n
P
Ay
P+nPBy
P
nA+nB
and is the same under both institutional arrange-
ments as there is no e¢ ciency cost from taxation. Therefore, variance under
decentralization and centralization are respectively given by
V (ti; tj) =
1
nA+nB
P
j=A;B
P
i=R;P n
i
j
 
cij (tj)  c
2
V (t) = 1nA+nB
P
i=R;P
 
niA + n
i
B

(ci (t)  c)2
Suppose that a benevolent social planner has to choose a uniform tax rate t
so as to maximize W (t) subject to cR = (1  t) yR and cP = yP + (n
R
A+n
R
B)
(nPA+nPB)
yRt.
As total welfare is simply the sum of private utilities, which are logarithmic, we
have the following result:
Proposition 3: The uniform tax rate that minimizes total inequality (i.e.
such that V (t) = 0) and the one that maximizes total welfare coincide, and is
given by
t =
 
yR   yP 
yR
 
nPA + n
P
B

(nA + nB)
Proof : Direct by solving the corresponding maximization problems.
Therefore, maximizing total welfare under a centralized system of redistribu-
tion means minimizing total inequality. Notice that this means minimizing both
5That is, the nal utility of a poor individual in region A is given by
UPA = u

cPA

+ 
(

"
nPA
nA
u

cPA

+
nRA
nA
u

cRA
#
+ (1  )
"
nPB
nB
u

cPB

+
nRB
nB
u

cRB
#)
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intraregional and interregional inequalities, that is, such that cR = cP in both
regions and cA = cB . As we did not include any e¢ ciency cost associated to
taxation, and as private utilities are strictly concave, total welfare is maximized
when consumption of the rich and of the poor are equalized both within and
between regions. Observe, furthermore, that the tax rate that t is independent
of group loyalty.
Interregional transfers from the poor to the rich region are benecial up
to the point where cR = cP in both regions. In this formulation, therefore,
more redistribution is always better from the point of view of total welfare
under centralization. In particular, total redistribution is best, that is, such
that all the poor and the rich in the economy have the same nal consumption.
Furthermore, this is true no matter the strength of group loyalty. In other
words, interregional transfers are benecial in that they permit to maximize
total welfare, even though voters in both regions care more about their own
people. However, observe that this is true only when the strength of group
loyalty is the same in both regions. Indeed, assume that A 6= B . In this case,
total welfare under centralization is given by
W (t) = (1 + )

u
 
cR
  
nRA + n
R
B

+u
 
cP
  
nPA + n
P
B
 + (A   B)  u  cR  nRA   nRB+u  cP   nPA   nPB

The tax rate that maximizes total welfare is now given by some et that de-
pends on both group loyalty parameters. In particular, we will have that @et@i > 0
if nPi > n
P
j for i; j = A;B. Therefore, eliminating both intra and inter-regional
inequalities is optimal only if the strength of group loyalty is the same in both
regions. If A 6= B and nPA 6= nPB , the rst best solution involves some strictly
positive level of inequality.
Assume now that A = B . We just saw that, in a centralized system,
the tax rate that maximizes total welfare is the one such that there remains
no inequality in the economy. However, as the regions di¤er regarding their
proportion of poor individuals, they also di¤er regarding their optimal level of
redistribution in a decentralized system. Suppose now the social planner has to
choose (tA; tB) so as to maximize W (tA; tB) subject to cRj = (1  tj) yR and
cPj = y
P +
nRj tjy
R
nPj
, j = A;B (i.e. there are no transfers between regions). The
solution to this problem is described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: The regional tax rates that maximize total welfare are given
by (tA; t

B) =

nPA
nA
(yR yP )
yR
;
nPB
nB
(yR yP )
yR

. Furthermore, they are such that
intra-regional inequalities are minimized, that is, such that VA (tA) = VB (t

B) =
0. This remains true when A 6= B .
Proof : Direct by solving the corresponding maximization problems.
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Comparing the two solutions, we then get the following result:
Proposition 5: Assume that nPi < n
P
j and all other parameters are the
same across regions. In this case, ti < t
 < tj and total welfare is strictly
higher under the uniform solution, that is, W
 
ti ; t

j

< W (t).
Proof : Assume nPA 6= nPB. It follows that W (tA; tB) > W (t) if and only
if nRA ln
cRA
cR
+ nPA ln
cPA
cP
+ nRB ln
cRB
cR
+ nPB ln
cPB
cP
> 0. We know that tA and t

B
are such that cPA = c
R
A = cA and c
P
B = c
R
B = cB. Furthermore, t
 is such
that cP = cR = c in both regions. Therefore, W (tA; t

B) > W (t
) if and only
if cBcA > (c)
2, or, equivalently, (1  tA) (1  tB) > (1  t)2, which is never
satised when nPA 6= nPB. Therefore, total welfare is strictly higher under the
uniform solution.
Therefore, the rst best solution is such that no inequality remains, both
within and between regions. Observe that neither the rst-best solution t
nor the second best one (tA; t

B) will be attained in a direct democracy, the
reason being that the decisive voter is partly self-interested. Under the uniform
solution t, all voters in the economy enjoy a nal utility of U (t) = (1 + ) ln c.
Under the non-uniform solution, all voters in region i enjoy a nal utility of
Ui
 
ti ; t

j

= ln ci +  [ ln ci + (1  ) ln cj ], i; j = A;B. As @Ui(t

i ;t

j )
@ > 0
if and only if nPi < n
P
j it follows that when n
P
i < n
P
j , we will have that
Ui
 
ti ; t

j

> U (t) whenever  > 1
h
ln

c
ci

+ ln

c
cj
i
ln

ci
cj
 , i; j = A;B. In fact, it
turns out that if nPi > n
P
j , a voter in region i is strictly better o¤ under the
uniform solution, and a voter in region j is strictly better o¤ under the non-
uniform solution.
The result in Proposition 5 is striking, as it basically states that when the two
regions are not identical, even though the spillovers can be fully internalized, the
uniform solution yields higher total welfare. This contrasts with the traditional
result according to which decentralization should be better in that case. Observe
that W (tA; t

B) > W (t
) if and only if UA (tA; t

B) + UB (t

A; t

B) > U (t
),
which is never satised when nPA 6= nPB . Again, the benets of pooling national
resources from a total welfare point of view imply that the best solution is always
perfect equality.
In order to compare the relative benets of the centralized and decentralized
solutions, we now go back to the equilibrium under a direct democracy in both
the symmetric and non-symmetric case.
11
4. Centralization versus Decentralization in a Direct Democracy
4.1. The Symmetric Case: nPA = n
P
B
Assume now that all parameters are the same across the two regions, and in
particular that nPA = n
P
B . Under decentralization, the regional tax rates will be
given by
tA =

(1 + )
nPj
nj
 
yR   yP 
yR
  1
(1 + )
nPj
nRj
yP
yR
= tB
Under centralization, no matter to which region the median voter belongs,
the uniform tax rate will be given by
t =

(1 + )
nPj
nj
 
yR   yP 
yR
  1
(1 + )
nPj
nRj
yP
yR
As the burden of redistribution is shared equally among the rich in the 2
regions (both in terms of income and proportions of poor), the centralized tax
rate is now independent of . Hence, the existence of group loyalty per se cannot
explain why redistribution would be lower in culturally diverse societies, a point
already made by Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2006). In addition to group loyalty,
some heterogeneity between the regions is needed regarding how rich they are,
implying that interregional transfers take place through a centralized system of
redistribution6 . We then have the following result:
Proposition 6: When nPA = n
P
B, it follows that tA = tB < t unless  = 1,
in which case they are equal. Then, as long as  < 1, total inequality is higher
under the decentralized solution, and total welfare is higher under the centralized
solution. Furthermore, all individuals in the economy are strictly better o¤ under
the centralized solution, that is, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization
when  < 1.
Proof: A voter i is better o¤ under decentralization if and only if U i (tA; tB) >
U i (t), i = R;P . When nPA = n
P
B and  = 1, it follows that U
i (tA; tB) = U
i (t),
i = R;P , so that all voters are indi¤erent between centralization and decen-
tralization. As we have @U
i(t)
@ = 0 and
@Ui(tA;tB)
@ > 0, i = R;P , all voters
are strictly better o¤ under centralization whenever  < 1, which in turn im-
plies that total welfare is strictly higher under the centralized solution whenever
 < 1. Finally, as tA = tB < t when  < 1, it follows directly that total
inequality is strictly lower under centralization.
6Note that if we allow yRA 6= yRB , we obtain t = (1+)
nPj
nPj +n
R
j
 1  2 yP
(yRA+y
R
B)

 
2
(1+)
yP
(yRA+y
R
B)
nPj
nRj
. As we saw, the fact that the tax rate remains independent of  when
yRA 6= yRB comes from the logarithmic form of the private utility function.
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Hence, in the symmetric case, as long as individuals care about the well-
being in the other region, the centralized tax rate is strictly higher than the
regional tax rates. Why is this so? As no interregional transfers are allowed
under decentralization, even though the median voter in each region might want
to transfer part of the regional tax revenue to the poor in the other region, he
cannot. This constraint imposed by the decentralized system could make him
vote for a strictly lower tax rate. However, this is more likely to be the case when
regions are heterogeneous regarding their proportion of poor and/or income.
Indeed, voluntary regional transfers are more likely to arise when there is a poor
and a rich region. Therefore, there seems to be some other mechanism at work
in the symmetric case yielding to lower redistribution under decentralization.
Under centralization, the decisive voter can force every other rich to pay his
preferred tax rate, the revenue of which will be transfered homogeneously to
the poor everywhere in the country. Under decentralization, each median voter
can only force the rich inside the region to pay the tax, the revenue of which will
be transferred to the poor inside the region. Thus, under the centralized regime,
and given that nPA = n
P
B , there are twice as many rich redistributing to twice
as many poor. Knowing that redistribution is implemented at this larger scale,
the decisive voter (as any other rich) is willing to redistribute more, which is
benecial to everyone. The fact of all voters being better o¤under centralization
no matter the strength of group loyalty is due to the fact that nPA = n
P
B , which
implies no net transfers between the two regions.
Observe that here, the mechanism through which centralization yields a
better outcome, in the sense of increased redistribution (which is protable for
everybody), is very di¤erent than the one highlighted in the traditional - social
planner - approach on scal federalism. Traditionally, the benet of centraliza-
tion lies in the fact that, under such a system, the social planner internalizes
all the regional spillovers. In our model, the voter choosing the tax rate un-
der both centralization and decentralization is the same person, who "selshly"
maximizes his own utility function when doing so. Therefore, this decisive voter,
when choosing the centralized tax rate, is not internalizing anything. In par-
ticular, he does not internalize the fact that voters in the other region also
care about his own region (i.e. the regional spillovers in redistribution). As
explained above, the reason why the median voter chooses to redistribute more
under centralization (as long as  < 1) is linked to the fact that he can force
more rich to redistribute to more poor. Said in other words, the underprovision
of redistribution under decentralization here comes from the reduced scale at
which redistribution is implemented, while it comes from the non-internalization
of spillovers in the standard approach, or from tax competition between regions
under the assumption of mobility of taxpayers and/or welfare recipients.
4.2. The Non-Symmetric Case: nPA 6= nPB
As before, let assume that the decisive voter under centralization is from
region A. If nPA < n
P
B , the median voter now faces some trade o¤when choosing
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the tax rate under the centralized regime. On the one hand, he can force the
whole population of rich to pay a given tax rate in order to help the poor. On the
other hand, he knows that most contributions will go to the region about the one
he cares the least. Whether, as a result of this trade-o¤, total inequality is still
lower under centralization (as in the symmetric case) depends on the parameters
of the model. In particular, the stronger group loyalty, the higher the implicit
disutility arising from the transfer to the poor region, the lower the centralized
tax rate, and the more likely that total inequality is higher under centralization.
If nPA > n
P
B , there is no such a trade-o¤, and total inequality is always lower
under the centralized solution. Finally, note that we can potentially have any
ordering between the three tax rates, depending on which region is decisive and
on the strength of group loyalty given the other parameters.
Proposition 7 below describes the properties of total welfare regarding group
loyalty under both centralization and decentralization:
Proposition 7: Total welfare under decentralization is increasing in group
loyalty, that is, @W (tA;tB)@ > 0. Assume region A is decisive under centralization.
If nPA > n
P
B, total welfare is increasing in group loyalty, that is,
@W (t)
@ > 0. If
nPA < n
P
B, the opposite holds, that is,
@W (t)
@ < 0.
Proof : As the median voter is partly selsh under any institutional arrange-
ment, he will always implement a tax rate such that the rich consume strictly
more than the poor. As total welfare under decentralization is maximized when
cRA = c
P
A and c
R
B = c
P
B, the result follows directly from the fact that
@tA
@ > 0
and @tB@ > 0. Similarly, as total welfare under centralization is maximized when
cR = cP , the result follows directly from the fact that @t@ > 0 when n
P
A > n
P
B
and @t@ < 0 when n
P
A < n
P
B.
We know from the social planner problem that total welfare is highest when
total inequality is minimized. Centralization has an advantage over decentral-
ization, as the pooling of resources permits to smooth consumption between rich
and poor across regions (i.e. cRA = c
R
B and c
P
A = c
P
B). The costs of centralization
from a total welfare point of view lie in the fact that cR 6= cP (intra-regional
inequality) and cA (t) 6= cB (t) (inter-regional inequality). The costs of decen-
tralization also come from the fact that cRi 6= cPi (intra-regional inequality), but
the inter-regional inequality cost now has two component: First, it will also be
true that cA (tA; tB) 6= cB (tA; tB), the di¤erence being strictly higher than in
the centralized case, but also that cRA 6= cRB and cPA 6= cPB . Therefore, whenever
V (t) < V (tA; tB), it follows that W (t) > W (tA; tB). However, even though
V (t) > V (tA; tB) (when the rich region is decisive and  is high), it will still be
the case that W (t) > W (tA; tB) for some range of  (or for the whole range),
as the benets coming from the pooling of resources more than o¤set the cost of
a lower preferred tax rate by the median voter (and thus possibly higher total
inequality). We thus have the following claim:
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Claim 1: If V (t) < V (tA; tB), it follows that W (t) > W (tA; tB), that
is, V (t) < V (tA; tB) is a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for W (t) >
W (tA; tB) to hold.
We then have the following result in the absence of group loyalty:
Proposition 8: Assume nPA 6= nPB. In the absence of group loyalty, total
welfare is strictly higher under the centralized solution. This is true no matter
whether it is the rich or the poor region that is decisive. That is, if  = 12 , it
follows that W (t) > W (tA; tB).
Proof : Assume nPA 6= nPB. In the absence of group loyalty, total inequality
is strictly higher under the decentralized solution, no matter which region is
decisive (see appendix). From Claim 1, it follows that W (t) > W (tA; tB).
Observe that if there is no group loyalty, the preferred centralized tax rate
of a rich voter in A and in B is the same, even though nPA 6= nPB . This is only
true when  = 12 , as the potential disutility of interregional transfers disappears
in that case. As individuals no longer give priority to their own region, they
give the same weight to reducing intra-regional inequalities (in both regions)
and inter-regional inequalities. In other words, interregional inequalities arising
from decentralization (i.e. the fact that both cRA 6= cRB and cPA 6= cPB) constitute a
pure loss from the point of view of any individual, and thus from a total welfare
point of view.
When  = 12 , the nal utility of any voter i = R;P in region j = A;B is an
increasing function of total welfare under the corresponding solution, that is,
U ij = u
 
cij

+

(1 + )
W
2nj
Therefore, when  = 12 , each individual cares about two things: himself and
total welfare. Given that each individual weights equally total welfare in the
two regions, the median voter, whoever it is, would like to pool national resources
and choose his preferred tax rate so as to implement his preferred redistribution
policy everywhere in the country. Indeed, as  = 12 , the median voter does not
wish to discriminate the individuals according to the region they come from.
The fact that all the rich (and also the poor) in the nation would choose the
same centralized tax rate conrms this intuition: the fact that nPA 6= nPB is not
relevant anymore when choosing t, given that  = 12 , as the only thing that
matters now from the point of view of any individual is the national proportion
of poor, and, as a consequence, the median voter would like to smooth their
consumption across the nation. In other words, voters now only care about
total inequality, to an extent depending on the weight they put on selsh versus
altruistic motives. A decentralized system just adds a constraint to the choice
of the median voter here, as he can only choose redistribution in his region, even
though he cares equally about the other region.
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Proposition 9: Assume region A is decisive under centralization. (i) If
nPA > n
P
B, total welfare is strictly higher under the centralized solution for all
; (ii) if nPA < n
P
B, total welfare is strictly higher under the centralized solution
whenever  is below some threshold e, where e is strictly increasing in income
dispersion. Furthermore, e is possibly higher or equal to 1, so that total welfare
might be always higher under centralization.
Proof : (i) If nPA > n
P
B, we have V (t) < V (tA; tB) for all  (see appendix).
From Claim 1, it follows that W (t) > W (tA; tB); (ii) from Proposition 8, we
know that when  = 12 , W (t) > W (tA; tB). From Proposition 7, as  increases,
W (tA; tB) increases and W (t) decreases, so that they will possibly be equal for
some e < 1. The properties of e can be proven using the implicit function
theorem (see appendix).
One of the traditional arguments against centralization is that such a system
is less sensitive to regional preferences - the so-called preference matching argu-
ment. Typically, such an ine¢ ciency is generated by the "uniformity" assump-
tion under centralization. However, this ad hoc assumption is not necessary
to generate reduced preference matching under centralization. For example,
Lockwood (2002) highlights a similar ine¢ ciency in a political economy model
where the full political process is modeled and where no uniformity is assumed
under centralization. While this uniformity assumption has been much criti-
cized both on empirical and theoretical grounds (see, for instance, Besley and
Coate (2003)), we believe that it remains appropriate in our set up. Indeed, as
the purpose of policy is pure redistribution, it is quite natural to assume a rule
of horizontal equity inside the geographical area in which the policy is imple-
mented. That is, voters should be treated the same way under centralization
no matter the region they belong to.
How does, then, the preference matching argument translate in our set up?
In the literature, the cost of centralization typically arises because the regions
value public goods di¤erently. In particular, if there are two regions, one of
them values the public good more than the other, and the social planner, when
setting the uniform level under centralization, consequently under-provides or
over-provides the public good in a given region. In our model, all voters value
redistribution the same way (i.e.  is the same for all voters, both within and
between regions) and the only source of heterogeneity is the fact that one region
has a higher proportion of poor individuals than the other. As a result of this
heterogeneity, the equilibrium regional tax rates under decentralization di¤er,
that is, tA 6= tB as long as nPA 6= nPB . Now, in the absence of group loyalty, the
centralized equilibrium tax rate would always be the same, no matter whether
it is the poor or the rich region that is decisive. The median voter, irrespective
of the region he belongs to, has the same redistributive preferences as long as
hes able to pool resources nationally. When  > 12 , redistributive preferences
di¤er between regions under both centralization and decentralization.
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What does this tell us? There are fundamentally two kinds of heterogeneity
between regions that interact here: regional average income and identity. If the
decisive voter under centralization belongs to the rich region, he would prefer
a decentralized system only to the extent that he cares more about his own
region, and thus implicitly dislikes interregional transfers to take place through
the redistribution policy. In other words, it is not the di¤erences in regional
average income per se that generate a cost under centralization, but rather the
fact that together with group loyalty, those di¤erences might cause a decrease in
the degree of solidarity in the society. Similarly, in the absence of group loyalty,
the interregional transfers that take place under centralization are benecial to
everyone (they increase the utility of each single voter), as the pooling of national
resources permits to smooth consumption of rich and poor across regions. In
this case, the only remaining source of heterogeneity (regional average income)
does not constitute a rationale for decentralization, neither from an individual
nor from a total welfare point of view. The rationale for decentralization only
arises when both sources of heterogeneity are present, given that the decisive
region is the rich one (recall that in the social planner problem, centralization
is always better, even though the two forms of heterogeneity are there).
Oates decentralization theorem states that (i) If there are no spillovers
and regions are identical, then centralization and decentralization are equally
e¢ cient;
(ii) If there are no spillovers and regions are not identical, then decentral-
ization is more e¢ cient than centralization;
(iii) If there are spillovers and regions are identical, then centralization is
more e¢ cient than decentralization.
In our set up, the theorem would become that (i) If there are no spillovers
( = 1) and regions are identical (nPA = n
P
B), then centralization and decen-
tralization are equally e¢ cient;
(ii) If there are no spillovers ( = 1) and regions are not identical (nPA 6=
nPB), then centralization is more e¢ cient than decentralization provided that the
poor region is decisive under centralization. Otherwise, it is ambiguous which
institutional arrangement yields higher total welfare;
(iii) If there are spillovers ( < 1) and regions are identical (nPA = n
P
B),
then centralization is more e¢ cient than decentralization;
(iv) If spillovers are total ( = 12), centralization is always more e¢ cient
than decentralization, no matter whether the regions are identical or not.
Points (i) and (iii) are identical to the ones in Oates theorem. However,
from point (ii), it turns out that even when there are no spillovers, the poor
region can gain from a centralized policy (always if it is decisive, but sometimes
even when it is not), meaning that decentralization will not be Pareto pre-
ferred to centralization. This is because the resources pooling will nearly always
benet the poor region, which might make total welfare strictly higher under
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centralization. From point (iv), even though there are spillovers and regions
are not identical, implying some kind of trade-o¤ in the traditional approach,
centralization will always be more e¢ cient than decentralization. As explained,
the fact that  = 12 makes the regional heterogeneity regarding average incomes
irrelevant from an individual point of view. In fact, in that case, centralization
always Pareto-dominates decentralization. More importantly, it turns out that
increased heterogeneity need not increase the attractiveness of decentralization
from a welfare perspective. Indeed, when nPA = n
P
B and  < 1, decentralization
is Pareto-dominated but as tA = tB , rich and poor end up with the same nal
consumption in both regions. In contrast, when nPA 6= nPB (and thus (tA 6= tB),
centralization becomes even more attractive as the fact that nal consumptions
di¤er between regions constitute an additional loss from a total welfare point of
view, which is avoidable under centralization, although in that case, depending
on , decentralization need not be Pareto-dominated7 .
Bolton and Roland (1997) show that income-based redistribution has three
e¤ects on the incentives to secede: (i) a political e¤ect, as the regional and
national median incomes di¤er; (ii) a tax base e¤ect, as average income di¤ers
between regions and (iii) an e¢ ciency e¤ect, as total income is lower as a result
of a breakup. The political e¤ect reects di¤erences in preferences for redis-
tribution and induces a given region to secede, independently of the existence
of interregional transfers. Such transfers arise when regional average incomes
di¤er, and typically induce richer regions to secede (the tax-base e¤ect). In
our set up, we do not really have the political e¤ect. Such an e¤ect is related
to the preference-matching argument described above, and the presence of al-
truism in our model sort of cancels regional di¤erences in preferences as long
as the regions share a common identity. Still, even when  = 12 , we will have
tA 6= tB as long as nPA 6= nPB , but those di¤erences are only due to the fact
that the median voters are not able to pool national resources, as they would
otherwise vote for the same uniform tax rate under a centralized system, and
would be strictly better o¤ by doing so. That is, the two median voters do not
di¤er in their tastes, but rather in their ability to redistribute. As group loyalty
gets stronger, both regions might strictly prefer a decentralized system. The
rich region, because it dislikes the transfers to take place. And the poor region,
because the centralized tax rate might be so low (if the other region is decisive)
that it actually prefers to implement its own redistribution policy even though
it will not benet from a transfer. Once again, it is the interaction between
group loyalty and regional di¤erences in average income that generate the in-
centives to decentralize. Notice, also, that it is so because we did not assume any
other kind of heterogeneity between regions. Indeed, if we had assumed di¤er-
ent regional weights for altruistic motives (A 6= B) or, alternatively, di¤erent
median incomes (yRA 6= yRB), this would create such a political e¤ect as in Bolton
and Roland (1997). That is, in the absence of transfers, the regions still have an
7Notice, however, that if  = 1 and the rich region is decisive, the relative e¢ ciency of
decentralization is actually increasing in heterogeneity, as this heterogeneity is really harmful
under the centralized solution.
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incentive to secede as their preferences for redistribution di¤er. Fundamentally,
what we mean here by group loyalty is the fact that a given individual values
redistribution relatively more in his own region. Hence, we do not allow for a
potential heterogeneity in preferences regarding redistribution.
Finally, in Bolton and Roland (1997), the tax-base e¤ect always induces the
richer region to secede. In contrast, this is true in our model only to the extent
that the median voter in the richer region cares more (or only) about his own
region. Otherwise, if there is no group loyalty, the pooling of national resources
is benecial to everyone. As in Bolton and Roland (1997), the tax-base e¤ect
always reduces the incentives to break up for the poor region in our model.
However, when the rich region is decisive and group loyalty is very strong, the
poor region might be better o¤ under the decentralized system, even though it
receives a positive transfer under centralization.
5. The choice between Centralization and Decentralization
After having investigated which institutional arrangement yields higher total
welfare, a natural question that arises is whether the best solution is sustain-
able as an equilibrium in a direct democracy. Obviously, this requires mak-
ing assumptions regarding the rule under which a given system (centralized or
decentralized) can be implemented. Suppose centralization is the status quo.
Implementing a decentralized system could require, for instance, the following:
unanimity in both regions, simple majority in both regions, simple majority in
one region. Then, if the best solution is not sustainable as an equilibrium under
the corresponding rule, another question that arises is whether there exists an
accommodating policy (i.e. a tax rate) such that the ine¢ cient solution (i.e.
the one that yields lower total welfare) can be avoided. In this section, in order
to answer these questions, we compare individual utility levels under both the
centralized and decentralized solutions.
We already saw that when the two regions are equally rich (nPA = n
P
B),
centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization (Proposition 6). It turns out
that the same result holds for "cultural" homogeneity ( = 12 ). Proposition 10
below states that in the absence of group loyalty, all voters are strictly better
o¤ under a centralized system of redistribution. As already explained, when
cultural heterogeneity disappears, every individual is strictly better o¤ when
resources are pooled nationally.
Proposition 10: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and
nPA 6= nPB. If  = 12 , all voters are strictly better o¤ under the centralized solu-
tion. That is, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization whenever there
is no group loyalty.
Proof : In appendix.
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Suppose the decisive voter under centralization is from the rich region. Im-
plicit in our formulation is that decentralization has a cost in terms of interre-
gional inequality, this cost being decreasing in  from the point of view of the
decisive voter. Then, from the point of view of this same voter, centralization
has a cost in terms of interregional transfers, this cost being increasing in .
Therefore, the decisive voter faces some trade-o¤when hes from the rich region.
Decentralization makes reducing intra-regional inequality cheaper, but does not
allow for inter-regional transfers. Centralization allows to reduce interregional
inequality, but makes reducing intraregional inequality more costly. Therefore,
whether the decisive voter in the rich region is better o¤ under a decentralized
system depends on the resolution of this trade-o¤, and hence on .
Proposition 11: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and  =
1. If nPA < n
P
B,
(i) all voters in region A are strictly better o¤ under the decentralized so-
lution, that is, U jA (tA; tB) > U
j
A (t), j = P;R. In other words, centralization
never Pareto-dominates decentralization;
(ii) if the other parameters are such that W (t) > W (tA; tB) and the rich
in A can unilaterally choose to decentralize, there exists no accommodating tax
rate such that decentralization can be avoided.
If, on the contrary, nPA > n
P
B,
(iii) all voters in region A are strictly better o¤ under the centralized solution,
that is, U iA (tA; tB) < U
i
A (t), i = P;R;
(iv) the rich in region B are strictly better o¤ under the decentralized so-
lution, that is, URB (tA; tB) > U
R
B (t). In other words, decentralization never
Pareto-dominates centralization, and centralization never Pareto-dominates de-
centralization;
(v) if region B can unilaterally choose to decentralize, there exists no accom-
modating tax rate such that decentralization can be avoided.
Proof : In appendix.
When the rich region is decisive and there is full group loyalty, decentral-
ization will always obtain in equilibrium provided that the rich region can uni-
laterally decide to decentralize. In particular, as no accommodating tax rate
exists, decentralization will obtain even when the other parameters are such that
W (t) > W (tA; tB). However, as no voter cares about the voters in the other re-
gion in that case, it seems hard to justify a centrally implemented redistributive
policy when there is full group loyalty.
Proposition 12: Assume region A is decisive under centralization. If nPA <
nPB, there is some range of  for which total welfare is strictly higher under
the centralized solution but for which decentralization obtains in equilibrium,
provided that the rich in A can unilaterally choose to decentralize. Furthermore,
for this same range of , there exists no accommodating tax rate such that
decentralization can be avoided.
Proof: In appendix.
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Therefore, with imperfect group loyalty, and provided that the rich region
is decisive, the same kind of ine¢ ciency arises, that is, for some range of 
(the size of which depends on the other parameters), decentralization obtains in
equilibrium although it is strictly dominated from a total welfare point of view.
When there is full group loyalty, centralization never Pareto-dominates de-
centralization, no matter whether it is the poor or the rich region that is deci-
sive under centralization. More importantly, if nPA > n
P
B , decentralization never
Pareto-dominates centralization, that is, even though there are no spillovers in
the redistribution policy, the choice of decentralization can never be unanimous
when the decisive region is the poor one.
When the poor region is decisive and there is full group loyalty, even though
W (t) > W (tA; tB), the question arises whether it is reasonable to promote a
centralized system. Indeed, the higher total welfare arising under centralization
here comes from the poor region selshly exploiting the rich region. If a ma-
jority in each region is required to implement a decentralized system, the rich
region will never be able to stop making implicit transfers to the poor region
through the redistribution policy. Such a situation might be rather unstable, as
separatist tensions are very likely to arise (recall that  = 1). More importantly,
it turns out that no uniform tax rate exists such that the rich in B would be
better o¤ under a uniform solution8 . However, as described in Proposition 13
below, such an accommodating tax rate might exist when the poor region is
decisive provided that group loyalty is not perfect.
Proposition 13: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and
nPA > n
P
B. If a majority in only one region is required to implement a de-
centralized system, and  is such that decentralization obtains in equilibrium,
there might exist an accommodating (uniform) tax rate et < t such that both re-
gions are in favor of centralization with et, and such that total welfare is strictly
higher under the accommodating tax rate than under the decentralized solution.
Proof: From the example below. A necessary condition for an accommodat-
ing tax rate to exist is that the rich in B would be better o¤ under centralization
if he was decisive. In other words,  cannot be too high given the other parame-
ters.
8More generally, the question arises whether group loyalty is something valuable for the
general well-being. Under decentralization, it is clearly benecial, as it increases solidarity
(i.e. the less spillovers, the more e¢ cient the decentralized solution). It is also clearly harmful
under centralization when the rich region is decisive, precisely for the same reason (i.e. the
more spillovers, the more e¢ cient the centralized solution). Now, even though total welfare is
increasing in group loyalty under centralization when the poor region is decisive, observe that
the fact that t is increasing in  means that redistribution is actually decreasing in the level of
spillovers under centralization, which should not be considered as an e¢ cient characteristic.
Notice however that, as already mentioned, voters are never internalizing anything in this
set up under any arrangement, as the equilibrium always arises from the maximization of
some voters individual utility (i.e. there is no social planner nor legislative process under
centralization through which spillovers could be at least partly internalized).
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In order to illustrate Proposition 13, lets look at an example. Suppose there
are 100 voters in each region, region A is decisive under centralization, nPA = 90
and nPB = 10. Suppose furthermore that  = 1, y
P = 1, yR = 100 and  = 0:75
(i.e. there is imperfect group loyalty). Figure 1 depicts individual utility levels of
the rich in both regions under decentralization and centralization for t 2 [0; 0:8].
Given the value of those parameters, W (t) > W (tA; tB) as long as t > 0:04.
At the equilibrium t, we have W (t) > W (tA; tB) but URB (tA; tB) > U
R
B (t
),
so that decentralization obtains in equilibrium if the rich in B can unilaterally
decide to decentralize. However, as can be seen in the gure, there exists t < t
such that both URj (t) > U
R
j (tA; tB), j = A;B, and W (t) > W (tA; tB), so that
decentralization - the ine¢ cient solution - can be avoided.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
Figure 1: Existence of an accomodating tax rate
URCA
URCB
URDA
URDB
t*
accomodating t
To sum up, three conclusions emerge from this section: rst, if there is no
group loyalty nor di¤erences in regional average incomes, centralization Pareto-
dominates decentralization, and thus centralization obtains. Second, when the
rich region is decisive under centralization, in the cases where the decentral-
ized solution is dominated from a welfare perspective, there will never exist an
accommodating tax rate to avoid decentralization, provided that it obtains in
equilibrium. In other words, if the rich region is decisive and can unilaterally
decide to decentralize, the political economy equilibrium might be ine¢ cient.
Third, when the poor region is decisive, and given that group loyalty is not
"too" strong, there might exist an accommodating tax rate such that decentral-
ization can be avoided when it is ine¢ cient (and such that total welfare remains
higher under the accommodating tax rate than under decentralization).
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6. Voluntary Interregional Transfers under Decentralization
As the cost of decentralization lies in the fact that no transfers between re-
gions occur under such a system, a natural question that arises is whether - for
the cases where W (t) > W (tA; tB) - centralization still dominates decentraliza-
tion when allowing the rich region to transfer part of its tax revenue to the poor
region under the decentralized system. Such a transfer allows for some bene-
cial pooling of resources, while it permits the median voter in the rich region to
control the amount to be transferred to the poor region (and thus such a system
might be easier to implement politically than a centralized system). However,
the possibility of a transfer also creates an incentive for the rich in the poor
region to free ride on the generosity of the rich region. That is, knowing that
their poor will receive a transfer from outside, the rich in the poor region are less
willing to contribute to the regional redistribution policy. Therefore, it is not
obvious whether a decentralized system with transfer dominates a centralized
system from a welfare perspective. We now turn to investigate this issue.
Suppose that after the regional tax rates have been implemented, the rich
region (region A) is allowed to transfer some proportion of its tax revenue to the
poor region (region B). The rich region will be willing to do so provided that
the median voter cares about the other region, that is, provided that A < 1.
The individualsbudget constraints will now be given by
cRA = (1  tA) yR
cRB = (1  tB) yR
cPA = y
P + tAn
R
Ay
R 
nPA
cPB = y
P +
tBn
R
By
R
nPB
+ tAn
R
Ay
R (1  )
nPB
where  is the proportion of tax revenue in A that stays in the region and is to
be determined endogenously. We consider a two-stage game: in the rst stage,
the regional tax rates are implemented, and in the second stage the median
voter in the rich region chooses . Solving backwards, we rst determine the
choice of  for given (tA; tB) before solving for the equilibrium tax rates.
6.1. The Social Planner Problem
Suppose a social planner has to choose (tA; t

B ; ) so as to maximize total
welfare. Solving the game backwards, we get
(1   (tA; tB)) =
nPAn
P
B (t

B   tA) + nB
 
nPBt

A   nPAtB

nRA
 
nPA + n
P
B

tA
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The reaction functions are strictly decreasing, and
tA =
 
yR   yP 
yR
 
nPA + n
P
B

(nA + nB)
= tB
Therefore, the optimal transfer is given by
(1  ) = nA
nRA
 
nPB   nPA
 
nPA + n
P
B

Proposition 14: The optimal values of (tA; t

B ; 
) are such that tA = t

B
and cRA = c
R
B = c
P
A = c
P
B = c.
Proof : Direct by solving the corresponding maximization problem.
As expected, the optimal solutions of the centralized system and the de-
centralized system with transfer coincide, that is, total welfare is maximized
when perfect equality among individuals is achieved, both within and between
regions.
6.2. Direct Democracy
Solving now the second stage of the game for the median voter in region A,
we get  (tA; tB):
@URA
@
= 0
, A

nPA
nA
u0
 
cPA
 tAnRAyR
nPA

   (1  A)

nPB
nB
u0
 
cPB
 tAnRAyR
nPB

= 0
, Au0
 
cPA

= (1  A)u0
 
cPB

Assuming that utilities are logarithmic, we get the following result:
Proposition 15: The transfer to the poor region has the following proper-
ties: @(1 )@tA > 0,
@(1 )
@tB
< 0, @(1 )@A < 0,
@(1 )
@yR
> 0, @(1 )
@yP
< 0, @(1 )
@nPA
< 0
and the sign of @(1 )
@nPB
is ambiguous.
Proof : In appendix.
The properties of the transfer are intuitive. As expected, there is a threshold
value of A above which the transfer would be negative. Obviously, an increase
in group loyalty in the second period has a negative e¤ect on the transfer to the
poor region. In fact, when A = 1, (1  ) < 0, which we do not admit. Observe
that the e¤ect of an increase in the proportion of poor in the poor region has an
ambiguous e¤ect on the transfer. Indeed, as more poor in B will benet from
the transfer, the median voter in the rich region would like to transfer more.
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However, precisely because the poor in B are more numerous, the median voter
also realizes that the transfer will have to be shared among more individuals,
meaning that it is now more expensive to help those poor, which induces him
to decrease the size of the transfer.
Suppose A is low enough so that the transfer is positive (otherwise, we are
back to the decentralized case without transfer). Substituting for  (tA; tB) in
URA and U
R
B and solving for the rst stage of the game, we get tA and tB as a
function of one another. That is, we get reaction functions. Furthermore, we
have that @tA(tB)@tB < 0 and
@tB(tA)
@tA
< 0. As we just saw, if a higher tax rate
is implemented in region B in the rst period, region A will decrease the size
of the transfer to the poor in B in the second period. Therefore, as it keeps a
higher proportion of its tax revenue for the transfer to its own poor, region A
can decrease its local tax rate. Similarly, given that tA is higher, the median
voter in the poor region correctly foresees that the rich region will be willing to
increase the transfer. As a result, he chooses a lower tax rate in equilibrium.
Substituting for tA (tB) and tB (tA) into one another, we can nally solve
for (tA; tB ; ) as a function of the exogenous parameters. Doing so, we get the
results in Proposition 169 :
Proposition 16: In equilibrium, (i) the tax rates in region j = A;B have
the following properties: @tj
@yR
> 0, @tj
@yP
< 0 and the sign of @tj@ ,
@tj
@B
, @tj
@nPA
and
@tj
@nPB
is ambiguous. Furthermore, @tA@A < 0 and
@tB
@A
> 0;
(ii) the absolute transfer T = (1  ) tAyRnRA has the following properties:
@T
@A
< 0, @T@B > 0 if
nPA
nA
>
nPB
nPB+n
R
B(1+)
, and when A = B = , it follows
that @T@ < 0,
@T
@yP
< 0 and @T@ < 0.
Proof : In appendix.
Observe that the tax rate in the poor region is increasing in the strength of
group loyalty in the rich region. Indeed, if A increases in the rst period, the
median voter in B foresees that the transfer in the second period will be lower.
As a result, he votes for a higher tax rate in the rst period. In contrast, an
increase in B has an ambiguous e¤ect on tB in the rst period. On the one
hand, an increase in B induces the median voter to redistribute more, as in
the case without transfer. On the other hand, the median voter realizes that
by doing so, he will provoke a decrease in the transfer in the second period,
which induces him to decrease the tax rate. Therefore, the total e¤ect depends
on the relative magnitude of those two e¤ects. Finally, notice that the e¤ect of
9The comparative statics on the equilibrium value of the transfer (1  ) are quite cum-
bersome. Indeed, as the total e¤ect of the exogenous variables on the transfer depends on
both their direct e¤ect in the second period and their indirect e¤ect through the regional tax
rates in the rst period, it turns out to be a truly hard task to disentangle all those e¤ects
in order to understand its behaviour. However, we can instead get some comparative statics
results for the absolute transfer.
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an increase in  is also ambiguous, which is due to the fact that A and B
might be di¤erent. Observe, furthermore, that neither  nor B have a direct
e¤ect on the transfer in the second period. Therefore, the nal e¤ect of those
variables on the transfer are indirect and due to their e¤ect on the tax rates.
When A increases, the median voter wants to transfer a smaller share of
the local tax revenue to the poor region in the second period. As a result, he
implements a lower tax rate in the rst period. Notice that the e¤ect of an
increase in B on tA is also ambiguous, as it obviously depends on how tB will
react to this increase in the rst place, which is also ambiguous.
Quite strikingly, it turns out that the transfer is decreasing in general al-
truism. Why is this so? Being less selsh, the median voter in the poor region
has less incentives to free ride on the generosity of the rich region through the
transfer10 . As a result, the median voter in A will reduce its transfer to the poor
region in the second period. When  > 12 , the derivative of the transfer with re-
spect to  is given by @T@ = y
RnRA
h
@(1 )
@ tA +
@tA
@ (1  )
i
As the second term
is positive, it follows that the rst term is negative and higher in absolute value
than the second term. That is, free riding decreases in . Notice also that when
A = B , the total e¤ect of an increase in  on the size of the transfer is always
negative. In other words, the "increased free riding e¤ect" (i.e. B increases)
never compensates the fact that the median voter in A wishes to transfer less
to the poor region (i.e. A increases).
Proposition 17: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and
nPA < n
P
B. If  =
1
2 , it follows that
(i) tA > tB and the transfer is strictly positive and such that cPA = c
P
B < c
P ;
(ii) total inequality is strictly lower under centralization than under decen-
tralization with transfer, that is, V (t) < V (tA; tB ; );
(iii) total welfare is strictly higher under the centralized solution than under
the decentralized solution both with and without transfer. Furthermore, total
welfare is strictly higher under decentralization when allowing for the transfer,
that is, W (t) > W (tA; tB ; ) > W (tA; tB). This remains true when the poor
region is decisive under centralization.
Proof : (i) and (ii) in appendix; (iii) as total welfare under both central-
ization and decentralization with transfer is maximized when total inequality is
minimized (i.e. V (:) = 0), it follows that we can use the total variance as a
criterion to compare the two systems. From (ii), V (t) < V (tA; tB ; ) for  = 12 ,
and thus W (t) > W (tA; tB ; ). The fact that W (tA; tB ; ) > W (tA; tB) can be
proven analytically (see appendix). Finally, as t is the same whether region A
or B is decisive when there is no group loyalty, the result extends to the case in
which the poor region is decisive under centralization.
When  = 12 , region A, being richer, implements a higher tax rate in the
rst period, while it transfers part of its tax revenue to the poor region in the
10Note that @tB
@
> 0 when A = B .
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second period, so that cPA = c
P
B . Notice that the nal consumption of the poor
will be strictly lower than under the centralized system. Indeed, the median
voter in A, as he cannot force the rich in B to contribute as much as he would
like, chooses to redistribute less in equilibrium. Furthermore, it turns out that
both tB () < t and tB () < tB . In other words, the rich in B, knowing that
there will be a transfer, chooses to contribute less to the redistribution policy
(i.e. there is free riding even though  = 12 ). This is because the rich in B,
even though he cares equally about both regions, is still partly self-interested.
As he knows his poor will benet from a transfer, the rich in B votes for a
strictly lower tax rate than he would without the existence of the transfer. As a
result, the median voter in A chooses to redistribute strictly less than he would
under a centralized system. Therefore, the decentralized solution with transfer
yields less redistribution, and will produce inequality between the rich across
regions (i.e. cRA < c
R
B). As a result, total welfare will be strictly higher under
the centralized solution.
Observe that with no group loyalty, @(tA tB)@ < 0, that is, the more altruism,
the lower the di¤erence between the two tax rates. Notice, furthermore, that
when  = 12 , the absolute transfer is always given by
(nPB nPA)(yR yP )
2 , and is
independent of . Thus, when  increases, tA has to increase less than tB in
order to have cPA = c
P
B . In other words, and as already mentioned, more altruism
in the society creates less free riding behavior. As a result, when altruism
decreases, total inequality under decentralization increases faster when allowing
for an after-tax transfer. In fact, it is not clear whether allowing for a transfer
under decentralization yields to more or less total inequality. However, when
 = 12 , total welfare is always strictly higher under the system with transfer,
as the benets of the transfer more than o¤set the potential cost of increased
inequality.
Proposition 18: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and
nPA < n
P
B. For all values of , and in particular for the values for which
the transfer is positive, total inequality is strictly lower under the centralized
solution. Therefore, it follows directly that for all values of , total welfare is
strictly higher under the centralized solution. That is, V (t) < V (tA; tB ; ) and
W (t) > W (tA; tB ; ) for all .
Proof : In appendix.
For the whole range of  for which the transfer is strictly positive, it turns
out that centralization strictly dominates decentralization from a welfare per-
spective. Of course, this does not mean that all voters are better o¤ under
centralization as long as the transfer is positive. Indeed, for example, the higher
, the more likely that the rich in A is better o¤ under the decentralized sys-
tem, as it gives him a better control of the amount of regional resources that
will be transferred to the poor region than under the uniformity imposed by the
centralized system. On the other hand, the free riding behavior of the rich in B
induces him to prefer the centralized system. Therefore, it is not trivial whether
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the rich in A (as well as the other voters) is better o¤ under a centralized system
or not when  > 12 . Now, when there is no group loyalty, we do get the following
results regarding individual utility levels:
Proposition 19: Assume region A is decisive under centralization and
nPA < n
P
B. If  =
1
2 ,
(i) The rich in B is strictly better o¤ than the rich in A in the system with
transfer, that is, URB (tA; tB ; ) > U
R
A (tA; tB ; );
(ii) The poor in both regions are strictly better o¤ under the centralized
system than under the decentralized system with transfer, that is, UP (t) >
UP (tA; tB ; );
(iii) The rich in A is strictly better o¤ under the centralized system than
under the decentralized system with transfer, that is, URA (t) > U
R
A (tA; tB ; ) >
URA (tA; tB);
(iv) The rich in B is strictly better o¤ under the decentralized system with
transfer than under the centralized system, that is, URB (tA; tB ; ) > U
R
B (t) >
URB (tA; tB).
Proof : in appendix.
With no group loyalty, except from the rich in the poor region, all voters
reach the highest nal utility level under the centralized system. The rich in A,
even though he can control the amount of resources to be transferred to the poor
region under the decentralized system with transfer, is strictly better o¤ under
centralization as such a system allows him to force the rich in B to contribute
more to redistribution. In contrast, the rich in B reaches the highest utility level
under the decentralized system with transfer, as such an arrangement gives him
the opportunity to free ride on the generosity of region A.
Proposition 20: Assume nPA < n
P
B and  >
1
2 is low enough so that the
transfer is strictly positive. Depending on the parameters, we can have either
W (tA; tB ; ) > W (tA; tB) or W (tA; tB ; ) < W (tA; tB).
Proof : From simulations (see appendix).
Therefore, it turns out that it is not even generally true that total welfare
under decentralization increases when allowing for the transfer. As already
mentioned, if the transfer allows for a benecial pooling of resources, benecial
in the sense that it reduces interregional inequality (i.e. W increases), it also
creates free riding behavior in the poor region, which increases total inequality
(i.e. W decreases).
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7. Concluding Remarks
We showed that in the presence of group loyalty and average income hetero-
geneity between regions, it is very often more e¢ cient to implement redistrib-
ution at the centralized level. It is always more e¢ cient when the poor region
is decisive under centralization, and it is also more e¢ cient when it is the rich
region that is decisive, given that group loyalty is not too strong. However,
even when group loyalty is perfect, the other parameters might be such that
centralization still dominates decentralization from a welfare perspective, as the
benets of pooling more than o¤set the costs of reduced redistribution.
It is clear, however, that those results need to be nuanced. If there is full
group loyalty, even though a centralized system might be better in the aggregate,
it does not seem truly reasonable to promote such a system, as it is very likely
that it will lead to potentially strong separatist tensions. Furthermore, if the
poor region is decisive, the higher welfare under centralization fundamentally
comes from the poor region selshly exploiting the rich region, which should not
be considered as something desirable. After all, if individuals in the two regions
do not care at all about each other, why should the rich region pay a transfer
to the poor region? However, if group loyalty is not perfect, individuals in the
rich region actually care about interregional inequality, and thus centralization
becomes attractive not only in the aggregate, but also from an individual per-
spective. Furthermore, the fact of redistribution being implemented at a larger
scale induces the median voter to increase the equilibrium level of redistribution
under centralization.
If the decisive voter under centralization is from the rich region and group
loyalty is not too strong, a centralized system of redistribution Pareto-dominates
a decentralized system. However, the higher group loyalty, the more likely that
centralization will not be sustainable as an equilibrium, given that the rich
region can unilaterally decide to decentralize. If the poor region is decisive under
centralization, the centralized system always dominates the decentralized one
from a welfare perspective. In this case, however, if the parameters are such that
decentralization obtains in equilibrium, there might exist an accommodating
tax rate such that every individual is better o¤ under that solution, and hence
decentralization can be avoided.
Implicit in our formulation is that decentralization has a cost in terms of
interregional inequality. Always in the aggregate, but also from an individual
perspective when group loyalty is not perfect. That is, to some extent, indi-
viduals in the rich region might want to transfer resources to the poor region.
Allowing the rich region to transfer resources voluntarily to the poor region
under a decentralized system is not e¢ cient, though: a centralized system will
always be better as it can address the free rider problem. Furthermore, not
only does a centralized system allow for reducing interregional inequality (pool-
ing e¤ect), but is also permit to reduce further (intra)regional inequality due to
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the scale e¤ect it has on the willingness of the decisive voter to redistribute (as
opposed to the traditional internalization of spillovers argument).
The rationale to decentralize in our set up is a negative one: given that
the individuals in the rich region dislike the interregional transfers taking place
through a centralized system, they will be more willing to redistribute under
decentralization, as they know that regional taxes will be spent locally. If group
loyalty is not too strong, however, there is some justication for a centrally im-
plemented system of redistribution. Furthermore, decentralizing redistribution
is likely to increase further interregional inequality in the long run, which might
also increase group loyalty due to segregation and polarization.
In order to focus on donor motivation, and as the poor do not pay taxes in
our set up, we have assumed that the median voter is always a rich individual.
Furthermore, for tractability, we made the extreme simplifying assumption that
all the rich and poor individuals have the same pre-tax income. In the spirit of
Bolton and Roland (1997), a possible extension would be to assume instead a
whole distribution of income within a region, while every voter pays taxes and
receives a transfer. Then, assuming that income distribution di¤ers between
regions (e.g. in the sense of rst- or second-order stochastic dominance), it
would be interesting to investigate how the identity of the median voter might
change under a centralized system, and how this a¤ects the choice between
centralized or decentralized redistribution.
More generally, we could assume additional sources of heterogeneity between
regions, such as the strength of altruism (A 6= B) or group loyalty (A 6= B).
Intuitively, this would create more rationale for decentralization, as individual
preferences for redistribution would now have regional specicities (preference-
matching). For example, if region A is poorer (i.e. nPA > n
P
B) but values
redistribution more than region B (i.e. A > B), it could well be the case that
individuals in the poor region are better o¤ under a decentralized system, if
this allows them to redistribute more, even though they will not benet from a
transfer from the rich region (as they would under centralization). A possibility
is that the decentralized system with transfer now dominates the centralized
one. Indeed, the decentralized system would have the additional advantage
of accommodating regional tastes regarding redistribution, while the transfer
would allow to reduce interregional inequality. Of course, the free riding problem
would still be there, but it might not be true anymore that centralization always
welfare-dominates decentralization with transfer.
A traditional argument against a decentralized system of redistribution is
the fact that under mobility, such a system might create tax competition be-
tween jurisdictions, and/or stratication of individuals by income. We did not
assume mobility neither of tax payers nor of welfare recipients in this paper,
as we believe that individual mobility motivated by tax/transfer di¤erences be-
tween jurisdictions might be very limited in practice, especially in a context of
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cultural diversity, and given that groups are geographically segmented. How-
ever, a possible extension would be to assume imperfect mobility, and that the
cost of moving for a given individual depends positively on the strength of group
loyalty. For example, if i =
1
2 , there is no cost of moving, and if i = 1, the
individual never wants to move (and the cost is strictly positive for 12 < i < 1).
Intuitively, this could reinforce the fact that less group loyalty increases the rel-
ative e¢ ciency of centralization. Indeed, the less group loyalty, the more the
median voter is willing to redistribute under centralization, the more mobil-
ity under decentralization, and hence the (even) more attractive a centralized
system of redistribution. Furthermore, if individuals are mobile, group loyalty
might have a negative e¤ect on redistribution also under decentralization, which
would decrease the rationale for such a system.
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9. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The equilibrium tax rate in region j = A;B
under the decentralized solution is given by
tj =

(1 + )
nPj
nj
 
yR   yP 
yR
  1
(1 + )
nPj
nRj
yP
yR
Taking derivatives, we get
(i) @tj
@nPj
=
 
h
(1+)n2j 2njnPj +(nPj )
2
i
yP+(nRj )
2
yR
(1+)nj(nRj )
2
yR
> 0 if and only if
 > y
P
(yR yP )

nj
nRj
2
(ii) @tj
@yR
=
nPj (nj+n
R
j )y
P
(1+)njnRj (y
R)2
> 0 and @tj
@yP
=   n
P
j (nj+n
R
j )
(1+)njnRj y
R < 0
(iii) @tj@ =
nPj (n
P
j y
P+nRj y
R)
(1+)2njnRj y
R > 0 and
@tj
@ =
nPj (n
P
j y
P+nRj y
R)
(1+)2njnRj y
R > 0
Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium tax rate under the centralized
solution is given by
t =
1
(1 + )
(



nPA
nA
+ (1  ) n
P
B
nB

  y
P
yR
 
nPA + n
P
B
 
nRA + n
R
B
 1 + nRA
nA
+  (1  ) n
R
B
nB
)
Taking derivatives, and given that nA = nB , we get
(i) @t
@nPA
R 0 if and only if  R e = 2nA(nA+nRA)yP
yP
h
4nAnPA (nPA+nPB)
2
i
+yR(nRA+nRB)
2
(ii) @t
@nPB
R 0 if and only if  Q b = h2(1+)n2B+(nPA+nPB)2 2nB(nPA+2nPB)iyP yR(nRA+nRB)2
yP
h
 4nBnPB+(nPA+nPB)
2
i
 yR(nRA+nRB)
2
and @t
@nPB
=   2(nA+n
R
A)y
P
(1+)(nRA+nRB)
2
yR
< 0 if  = 1
(iii) @t
@yR
=
(nPA+n
P
B)[nA+n
R
B+(n
P
B nPA)]yP
(1+)nA(nRA+nRB)(yR)
2 > 0
and @t
@yP
=
(nPA+n
P
B)f[(nPA nPB)+nPB] (1+)nAg
(1+)nA(nRA+nRB)yR
< 0
(iv) @t@ =  
[(nPA nPB)+nPB][(nPA+nPB)(yP yR)+2nAyR]
(1+)2nA(nRA+nRB)yR
> 0
(v) @t@ =

(1+)
(nPA nPB)
nA

1 +
(nPA+n
P
B)y
P
(nRA+nRB)yR

> 0 if and only if (
nPA nPB)
(nPA+nPB)
>
yP
yR
(nRA nRB)
(nRA+nRB)
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The E¤ect of Group Loyalty on t: General Case
Whether the centralized tax rate is increasing or not in  only depends
on whether nPA > n
P
B , and not on regional incomes, even when allowing for
yA 6= yB . Notice, however, that this feature is due to the logarithmic form of
private utilities. In general, the centralized equilibrium tax rate is implicitly
dened by
 (t) = 
 
nRAy
R
A + n
R
By
R
B
 
nPA + n
P
B
 "  nPAnA u0  cPA
+(1  ) nPBnB u0
 
cPB
 # u0  cRA yRA 
"

nRA
nA
u0
 
cRA

yRA
+(1  ) nRBnB u0
 
cRB

yRB
#
= 0
Using the implicit function theorem, we have that
@t
@
=  @=@
@=@t
Computing the derivatives, we obtain that @@t < 0 and
@
@ > 0 (and thus
@t
@ > 0) if and only if 
nRAy
R
A + n
R
By
R
B
 
nPA + n
P
B
 nPA
nA
u0
 
cPA
  nPB
nB
u0
 
cPB

>
nRA
nA
u0
 
cRA

yRA  
nRB
nB
u0
 
cRB

yRB
We see from the condition that if yPA = y
P
B and y
R
A = y
R
B , we will have, as
before, @t@ < 0 whenever the rich region is decisive. However, if we allow incomes
to di¤er accross regions, we might well have that the tax rate is increasing
in group loyalty, even though the decisive region is the one with the lowest
proportion of poors. For example, this is likely to be the case when yPA < y
P
B .
Indeed, the poors in A being poorer than the ones in B, they have a higher
marginal utility, somehow compensating the fact that they are less numerous
than in B. Regarding the incomes of the rich, things are less clear. Indeed,
the rich being richer in region A (i.e. yRA > y
R
B) has two di¤erent e¤ects. First,
the median voter, being richer than the rich in B, realizes that each rich in his
own region will contribute more (in absolute terms) to redistribution than each
rich in region B, which induces him to decrease his preferred tax rate when
group loyalty gets higher. However, another e¤ect is that, being richer, the rich
in A has a lower marginal disutility from giving than the rich in B, somehow
compensating the fact that region A has a higher proportion of rich (and so more
people in A contribute to redistribution than in B). Therefore, the total e¤ect
of group loyalty on the centralized tax rate depends on the relative magnitude
of those two e¤ects.
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Proof of Proposition 8: In the absence of group loyalty, that is, when
 = 12 , V (tA; tB)  V (t) > 0 if and only if
  2(n
P
A+n
P
B)[(n
P
A+n
P
B)y
P+(nRA+n
R
B)y
R]
2
(1+)2(nRA+nRB)
+
nPAf[( 2+)nPA (2+)nPB](yP yR) 4nByRg2+nPBf[(2+)nPA ( 2+)nPB](yP yR)+4nByRg2
(2+)2nB
+
nh
 (2+)nBnPA+(2+)(nB+nPA)nPB ( 2+)(nPB)
2
i
yP+nRB[(2+)n
P
A ( 2+)nPB]yR
o2
(2+)2nRBnB
+
nRA
nA
 
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR +
2[ (2+)nB+nPA](nPAyP+nRAyR)
(2+)nRA
2
> 0
which is satised for all  2 [0; 1] (checked on Mathematica). Therefore,
when  = 12 , total inequality is strictly higher under the decentralized solution.
Proof of Proposition 9: (i) When  = 12 , we know from Proposition 8
that V (t) < V (tA; tB). Then, when  = 1, V (tA; tB)  V (t) > 0 if and only if
  2(n
P
A nPA+nPB+nPB)
2
[(nPA+n
P
B)y
P+(nRA+n
R
B)y
R]
2
(1+)2(nRA+nRB)(nPA+nPB)
+
nPAf[( 1+)nPA (1+)nPB](yP yR) 2nByRg2+nPBf[(1+)nPA ( 1+)nPB](yP yR)+2nByRg2
(1+)2nB
+
f (1+)nB(nPA nPB)yP+nPB[(1+)nPA ( 1+)nPB](yP yR)+nB[(1+)nPA ( 1+)nPB]yRg2
(1+)2nRBnB
+
nRA
nA
 
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR   2(nA+n
R
A)(n
P
Ay
P+nRAy
R)
(1+)nRA
2
> 0
which is satised for all  2 [0; 1] (checked on Mathematica). Therefore,
when nPA > n
P
B , we have that V (t) < V (tA; tB) for both  =
1
2 and  = 1.
Now, we know that both @t@ > 0 and
@tj
@ > 0, j = A;B when n
P
A > n
P
B , so that
both @V (t)@ < 0 and
@V (tA;tB)
@ < 0 in that case. Then, as
@2V (t)
@@
=
22
 
nPA   nPB
2  
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR
2
(1 + )
2  
nRA + n
R
B
  
nPA + n
P
B

n2B
> 0
and
@2V (tA; tB)
@@
=  
32
h
nPAn
P
B
 
nPA
2
+
 
nPB
2  nB  nPA3 +  nPB3i  yP 2
 2nRAnRB
 
nPA
2
+
 
nPB
2
yP yR
 nRAnRB
 
yR
2 h   nPA2    nPB2 + nB  nPA + nPBi
(1 + )
4
n2Bn
R
An
R
B
> 0
it follows that V (t) < V (tA; tB) for all , and hence W (t) > W (tA; tB) for
all .
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(ii) The threshold e is implicitly dened by
 () =W (tA; tB) W (t) = 0
Using the implicit function theorem, we have that
@e
@x
=  @=@x
@=@
Given that nPA < n
P
B , it follows directly that
@
@ =
@W (tA;tB)
@   W (t)@ > 0.
Then, taking derivatives, we have that
@
@yR
=
(1 + )n2B
 
nPA   nPB
2
yP
 
yP   yR 
nPAy
P + nRAy
R
  
nPBy
P + nRBy
R
  
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR
 < 0
and
@
@yP
= (1 + )nB
264 2(n
P
A+n
P
B)
[(nPA+nPB)yP+(nRA+nRB)yR]
+
nPA
(nPAyP+nRAyR)
+
nPB
(nPByP+nRByR)
375 > 0
Therefore, it follows that @
e
@yR
=  @=@yR@=@ > 0 and @
e
@yP
=  @=@yP@=@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 10: When  = 12 , the preferred tax rate and nal
utilities of the rich and poor inA andB under centralization coincide. Therefore,
we can assume without loss of generality that nPA < n
P
B . As we know that when
 = 12 , W (t) > W (tA; tB), and as c
P
B < c
P , it follows directly that UPB (t) >
UPB (tA; tB). It is also direct that U
R
A (t) > U
R
A (tA; tB) from Proposition 19 by
transitivity. TO BE COMPLETED
Proof of Proposition 11: (i) With full group loyalty, the nal utility of a
given voter j = P;R in region A is given by
U jA (:) = u

cjA (:)

+ 

nPA
nA
u
 
cPA (:)

+
nRA
nA
u
 
cRA (:)

From the logarithmic form of the private utility function, it follows that the
second term of this expression is decreasing in intra-regional inequality. When
 = 1 and nPA < n
P
B , we know that tA > t and intra-regional inequality is strictly
higher under the centralized solution, so that the latter term is correspondingly
smaller (observe, furthermore, that cA (tA; tB) > cA (t), so that the "average"
e¤ect goes in the same direction, and hence no ambiguities). As in this case,
cPA (tA; tB) > c
P (t), it follows directly that UPA (tA; tB) > U
P
A (t). Finally, as
the median voter does not care about the other region (and thus does not want
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interregional transfers to take place) and tA maximizes URA (tA; tB), it follows
that URA (tA; tB) > U
R
A (t; tB) > U
R
A (t);
(ii) as t maximizes URA (t) and U
R
A (tA; tB) > U
R
A (t), there is no et 6= t such
that URA
 et > URA (tA; tB) (and possibly W  et > W (tA; tB));
(iii) when  = 1 and nPA < n
P
B , we know that tA < t and intra-regional
inequality is strictly higher under the decentralized solution (observe, further-
more, that cA (tA; tB) < cA (t), so that the "average" e¤ect goes in the same
direction, and hence no ambiguities). As in this case, cPA (tA; tB) < c
P (t), it
follows directly that UPA (tA; tB) < U
P
A (t). Finally, as the median voter does
not care about the other region (and thus wants interregional transfers to take
place) and t maximizes URA (t), it follows that U
R
A (t) > U
R
A (tA) > U
R
A (tA; tB);
(iv) as nPA > n
P
B and  = 1, it follows directly that U
R
B (tA; tB) > U
R
B (tA; t) >
URB (t);
(v) direct from the fact that URB (tA; tB) > U
R
B
 
tA;et > URB  et holds for anyet.
Proof of Proposition 12: The function URA depends on , and in par-
ticular, the higher , the higher the relative weight put on intraregional in-
equality relative to interregional inequality from the decisive voter point of
view. In contrast, the total welfare function W weights equally inter- and
intraregional inequality, whatever the value of . Said in other words, the
higher , the less weight put on the well-being in region B from the decisive
voter point of view. In contrast, whatever the value of , the well-being in
the two regions is always weighted equally in W . Therefore, it follows that
the e such that URA (t) = URA (tA; tB) is strictly smaller than the b such that
W (t) = W (tA; tB). Then, as t maximizes URA (t) and U
R
A (tA; tB) > U
R
A (t) for
 > e, there is no et 6= t such that URA  et > URA (tA; tB) for  2 e; b (and
possibly W
 et > W (tA; tB)).
Proof of Proposition 15: Assuming that private utilities are logarithmic,
the transfer to region B will be given by
(1  ) = (1  2A)n
P
An
P
By
P + yR

(1  A)nRAnPBtA   AnPAnRBtB

nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB

tAyR
Taking derivatives,
@ (1  )
@tA
=
(2A   1)nPAnPByP + yRtBAnPAnRB
nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB

(tA)
2
yR
> 0
@ (1  )
@tB
=   An
P
An
R
B
nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB

tA
< 0
@ (1  )
@A
=  n
P
An
P
B

nB (tA + tB) y
R + nPA
 
yP   tAyR

+ nPB
 
yP   tByR

nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB
2
tAyR
< 0
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@ (1  )
@yR
=
(2A   1)nPAnPByP
nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB

tA (yR)
2 > 0
@ (1  )
@yP
=
(1  2A)nPAnPB
nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB

tAyR
< 0
@ (1  )
@nPA
=
(2A   1)nPB
h
 A
 
nPA
2
+ (A   1)nBnPB
i
yP
+A
n
(A   1)
 
nRA
2
nPBtA + n
R
B
h
 A
 
nPA
2
+ (A   1)nBnPB
i
tB
o
yR 
nRA
2 
A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB
2
tAyR
< 0
@ (1  )
@nPB
=
An
P
A
   (A   1)nB (tA + tB) yR
+nPA

yP   2AyP   tAyR + A (tA + tB) yR
 
nRA

A
 
nPA   nPB

+ nPB
2
tAyR
7 0
Proof of Proposition 16: (i) Taking derivatives of the equilibrium values
of (tA; tB), we get
 @tA
@yR
=   (nB+An
R
A)(n
P
A+n
P
B)y
P [(B 1)nPA BnPB]
nRAf (A+B 1)nPAnPB+nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]g(yR)2 > 0
@tB
@yR
=
(nB+BnRB)(nPA+nPB)yP [A(nPA nPB)+nPB]
nRBf (A+B 1)nPAnPB+nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]g(yR)2 > 0
 @tA
@yP
=
(nB+AnRA)(n
P
A+n
P
B)[(B 1)nPA BnPB]
nRAf (A+B 1)nPAnPB+nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]gyR < 0
@tB
@yP
=   (nB+Bn
R
B)(nPA+nPB)[A(nPA nPB)+nPB]
nRBf (A+B 1)nPAnPB+nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]gyR < 0
 @tA@A =  

nB + BnB    (B   1)nPA
 
(B   1)nPA   BnPB
 nPAnPB + nB   nPA + nPB + nPB  nPA + nPB yP +  nRA + nRB yR
nRAf(A+B 1)nPAnPB nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]g2yR < 0
@tB
@A
=
 
nB + Bn
R
B
 
nPA   BnPA + BnPB
 nPAnPB + nB   nPA + nPB + nPB  nPA + nPB yP +  nRA + nRB yR
nRBf(A+B 1)nPAnPB nB[(1+A+A B)nPA+(1 A+B+B)nPB]g2yR > 0
The other derivatives (with respect to ; B ; n
P
A and n
P
B) are very long and
their sign is ambiguous.
(ii) Taking derivatives of the equilibrium value of T = (1  ) tAyRnRA, we
get
@T
@A
=  
nB

(B   1)nPA   BnPB
  
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

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 (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 (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(1 + 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>
nPB
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R
B (1 + )
;
and when A = B = , we have
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
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 
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
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B   1)B))nPA
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 (1  2B)nPAnPB + (1 + B)nB
 
nPA + n
P
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2 < 0
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=
(2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
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
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
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 (1  2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B)nB
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2 < 0
@T
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B (1 + )BnB
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2
+ (1  2B)
 
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2
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B (1 + B)nB
 
nPB
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 (1  2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B)nB
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P
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Proof of Proposition 17: (i) Given that  = 12 , we have that
tA   tB =
 
nPB   nPA
  
nPA + n
P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR

(2 + )nRAn
R
By
R
> 0
cPA =

 
nPA + n
P
B

yP + 
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR
2 (2 + )nB
= cPB
Comparing the centralized solution with the decentralized solution with
transfer when  = 12 we get
cP   cPA =

 
nPA + n
P
B

yP + 
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR
2 (2 + ) (1 + )nB
> 0
(ii) Given that  = 12 , we have that V (tA; tB ; )  V (t) is given by
1
4n2B
8<:

  (n
P
A+n
P
B)
(nRA+nRB)(1+)
2 +
2[ 2nPAnPB+nB(nPA+nPB)]
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R
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)
2
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 
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P
B

yP +
 
nRA + n
R
B

yR
2
9=; > 0
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(iii) Given that  = 12 , we have that W (tA; tB ; ) W (tA; tB) is given by
nB
8>><>>:
  ln 4 + ln

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R
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P+nRAy
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
+ ln
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P
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P+(nRA+n
R
B)y
R
nPBy
P+nRBy
R

9>>=>>; > 0
Proof of Proposition 18: V (tA; tB ; )  V (t) > 0 if and only if
 
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2 
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 
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
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1
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2
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
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 1)nPA 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(1 2)nPAnPB+(1+)nB(nPA+nPB)]
2
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
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(1 2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9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
is strictly positive, which is satised for all values of  (checked on Mathe-
matica). Therefore, V (tA; tB ; ) > V (t) for all values of  for which the transfer
is positive.
Proof of Proposition 19: (i) Direct from the fact that cRB (tA; tB ; ) >
cRA (tA; tB ; );
(ii) direct from the fact thatW (t) > W (tA; tB ; ) and cP (t) > cP (tA; tB ; );
(iii) if the median voter had the possibility to choose all the parameters
(tA; tB ; ), he would choose
etA;etB ;e such that cP (t) = cP etA;etB ;e, that
is, he would choose the same level of consumption of the poor as he would
under centralization. Furthermore, he would choose etA < tA, etB > tB , andetA < t < etB , and etB such that cRB etA;etB ;e = cP etA;etB ;e. This would
be a rst-best for the median voter, as he would control the contribution of
the rich in B and the transfer to the poor region, and he would be able to
discriminate between himself and the rich in B (which he wants to as hes partly
self-interested). Under centralization, the median voter implements his rst-best
level of consumption for the poor, which he doesnt under decentralization with
transfer. Furthermore, he can force the rich in B to pay a strictly higher tax rate
than under decentralization with transfer. If t < tA, it follows directly that the
median voter is better o¤ under centralization. However, even though t > tA,
40
hes still better o¤ under such a system. Indeed, given that he can force the
rich in B to contribute more, the median voter is willing himself to end up with
less consumption, as the benet from increased total welfare more than o¤sets
his personal loss of consumption. The median voter, ideally, would like to setetA < etB . However, under the decentralized system, he ends up paying more
than the rich in B, as tA > tB . Therefore, the best he can do is to set t > tB
(and possibly tA > t > tB) to implement his preferred level of consumption for
the poor, even though he might contribute more himself;
(iv) if the rich in B was decisive under centralization, given that  = 12 , he
would choose the same t as the rich in A, this t being strictly smaller than tB
and such that cP (t) > cP (tA; tB ; ). If the rich in B wanted to contribute more
under decentralization with transfer, so that the poor ends up with the same
consumption as under centralization, he would. Given that he doesnt, it follows
that hes strictly better o¤ under the decentralized system with transfer. That
is, the loss in total welfare less than o¤sets the benet of increased consumption
from his point of view.
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Proof of Proposition 20: Simulations of the model show that, depend-
ing on the parameter values, we can have either W (tA; tB ; ) > W (tA; tB) or
W (tA; tB ; ) < W (tA; tB) for  > 12 :
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
npa=10 and npb=90
Beta
WD
WDT
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
npa=10 and npb=15
Beta
WD
WDT
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